Shiba Inu’s Shibarium Bridge Could Be Linked to $2.4M Flash Loan Attack; 10 of 12 Validators Possibly Compromised
The post Shiba Inu’s Shibarium Bridge Could Be Linked to $2.4M Flash Loan Attack; 10 of 12 Validators Possibly Compromised appeared on BitcoinEthereumNews.com.
The Shibarium bridge hack was a flash-loan style exploit that drained roughly $2.4M (224.57 ETH and ~92.6B SHIB) by manipulating validator votes; Shibarium devs paused staking, moved funds to a 6-of-9 multisig, and launched a forensic investigation. Flash-loan bridge exploit drained 224.57 ETH and ~92.6B SHIB 10 of 12 validator signing keys were compromised; only two validators refused a malicious state Developers paused staking, moved funds to a 6-of-9 hardware multisig, and engaged Hexens, Seal911, and PeckShield Shibarium bridge hack: $2.4M drained in a flash loan exploit; read immediate impact on SHIB/BONE and the containment steps taken by developers. What happened in the Shibarium bridge hack? Shibarium bridge hack describes a flash loan-style exploit on 13 September that used borrowed liquidity to seize validator influence, allowing an attacker to sign a fraudulent state and drain 224.57 ETH and ~92.6 billion SHIB. Developers immediately paused sensitive functions and began a forensic response. ‘, ‘ 🚀 Advanced Trading Tools Await You!Maximize your potential. Join now and start trading! ‘, ‘ 📈 Professional Trading PlatformLeverage advanced tools and a wide range of coins to boost your investments. Sign up now! ‘ ]; var adplace = document.getElementById(“ads-bitget”); if (adplace) { var sessperindex = parseInt(sessionStorage.getItem(“adsindexBitget”)); var adsindex = isNaN(sessperindex) ? Math.floor(Math.random() * adscodesBitget.length) : sessperindex; adplace.innerHTML = adscodesBitget[adsindex]; sessperindex = adsindex === adscodesBitget.length – 1 ? 0 : adsindex + 1; sessionStorage.setItem(“adsindexBitget”, sessperindex); } })(); How did the attacker manipulate validator voting power? The attacker executed a rapid flash loan, used the borrowed funds to buy 4.6 million BONE tokens within a single block, and obtained the necessary voting weight to produce a malicious state. That temporary two-thirds majority depended on the loan-funded purchase; without it, the attacker could not have forged consensus. Details of the exploit The attacker leveraged bridge funds and a flash-loan…
Filed under: News - @ September 14, 2025 10:15 am